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ABSTRACT
Confronting Barriers to Human-Robot Cooperation:
Balancing Efficiency and Risk in Machine Behavior
Tim Whiting
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
In strategically rich settings in which machines and people do not fully share the
same preferences, machines must learn to cooperate and compromise with people to establish
mutually successful relationships. However, designing machines that effectively cooperate
with people in these settings is difficult due to a variety of technical and psychological
challenges. To better understand these challenges, we conducted a series of user studies in
which we investigated human-human, robot-robot, and human-robot cooperation in a simple,
yet strategically rich, resource-sharing scenario called the Block Dilemma, a game in which
players must balance fairness, efficiency, and risk. While both human-human and robot-robot
pairs typically learn fair and cooperative solutions over time, our results show that these
solutions tend to be different when communication is permitted versus when it is not. While
people followed a less risky and less efficient solution, pairs of robots followed a more risky
but more efficient solution. This difference in humans’ and machines’ behavior appears to
influence human-robot cooperation negatively, as our studies show that human-robot pairs
did not frequently produce either form of cooperation without communication. These results
speak to the need for machine behavior to be better aligned with human behavior. While
machines may behave more efficiently and produce better results than people when following
their own calculations, machines may often better facilitate human-machine cooperation
by aligning their behavior with human behavior rather than expecting human behavior to
become more efficient.
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Confronting barriers to human-robot
cooperation: balancing efficiency
and risk in machine behavior
Tim Whiting,1 Alvika Gautam,1 Jacob Tye,1 Michael Simmons,1 Jordan Henstrom,2 Mayada Oudah,3
and Jacob W. Crandall1,4,*
SUMMARY

Many technical and psychological challenges make it difficult to design machines
that effectively cooperate with people. To better understand these challenges,
we conducted a series of studies investigating human-human, robot-robot, and
human-robot cooperation in a strategically rich resource-sharing scenario, which
required players to balance efficiency, fairness, and risk. In these studies, both human-human and robot-robot dyads typically learned efficient and risky cooperative solutions when they could communicate. In the absence of communication,
robot dyads still often learned the same efficient solution, but human dyads
achieved a less efficient (less risky) form of cooperation. This difference in how
people and machines treat risk appeared to discourage human-robot cooperation, as human-robot dyads frequently failed to cooperate without communication. These results indicate that machine behavior should better align with human
behavior, promoting efficiency while simultaneously considering human tendencies toward risk and fairness.
INTRODUCTION
Smart devices, assistive technologies, medical assistants, recommender systems, driverless cars, and many
other automated systems are increasingly permeating the human society. These systems are being endowed with increasingly sophisticated machine learning algorithms and other forms of artificial intelligence so that they behave in ways that match and even exceed human capabilities. As these automated
systems engage with people in important tasks, including safety-critical ones, care must be taken to ensure
effective cooperation and coordination with people, especially when the preferences given to the machine
do not fully align with the preferences of their human partners.
When human and machine preferences are not fully aligned, machines must overcome a variety of barriers
to facilitate human-machine cooperation. We broadly group these barriers into two categories. The first
category relates to the attitudes people display toward machines that impact cooperation. For example,
prior work has shown that people are more likely to lie and cheat when they believe they are interacting
with a machine rather than a human (Kiesler et al., 1996; Cohn et al., 2018), offer less incentives to potential
machine partners than potential human partners when negotiating the formation of teams (van Wissen
et al., 2012), and are less inclined to cooperate with machine partners than human partners in prisoner’s
dilemmas (Ishowo-Oloko et al., 2019). Importantly, a recent study revealed that people fail to activate mentalizing regions of the brain when they believe they are interacting with an artificial agent (as opposed to
another person) (Chaminade et al., 2012). As in human-human interactions (Sally, 1995; Balliet, 2009), these
attitudes can potentially be overcome or influenced using, among other things, communication (e.g., Crandall et al., 2018) and physical appearance (e.g., Goetz et al., 2003), although thoroughly addressing these
and other related barriers to human-machine cooperation remains an open research question.
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The second set of barriers to human-machine cooperation is related to the strategic behavior of machines (Rahwan et al., 2019). When the preferences of individuals are not fully aligned, the effectiveness of a strategy often
depends on the behavior of one’s associates (for example, see Axelrod’s discussion about iterated prisoner’s
dilemmas, Axelrod, 1984). This results in highly complex solution spaces, which makes computing and determining effective strategies difficult (e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2009; Gintis, 2000). The methods most commonly
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used by machines to compute or learn behavior are based on gradient ascent or other related optimization techniques. These methods can produce effective behavior in zero-sum games, including Checkers (Schaeffer et al.,
2007), Chess (Campbell et al., 2002), Poker (Bowling et al., 2015; Moravcı́k et al., 2017), and Go Silver et al. (2016).
However, in many other scenarios (including social dilemmas and repeated general-sum games) in which cooperation is beneficial but nontrivial, these algorithms often produce myopic, non-cooperative, and low performing
(Crandall et al., 2018) behavior due to the non-stationary dynamics of the environment (caused by the different
players adapting to each other) and the multiplicity of available equilibria.
Substantial effort has been dedicated to developing modified or alternative methods for (repeated) general-sum games. These efforts have allowed machines to learn strategies that induce cooperation (with
varying levels of success) in some contexts (e.g., Sandholm and Crites (1996); Littman (2001); Powers and
Shoham (2005); Littman and Stone (2005, 2001); De Cote and Littman (2008); Gal et al. (2010); Albrecht
and Ramamoorthy (2013); Elidrisi et al. (2014); Crandall (2014); Leibo et al., 2017; Foerster et al. (2018)).
For the studies conducted in this article, we equipped our robot with S#, a multi-agent learning algorithm
that has, in prior work, demonstrated the ability to induce human-machine cooperation in repeated games
under certain communication conditions (Crandall et al., 2018).
Although S# has demonstrated the ability to establish cooperative relationships with people in a variety of
repeated games when it can communicate, it often fails to establish cooperative relationships with people
when communication is not possible (Crandall et al., 2018). To better understand why S# sometimes fails to establish human-machine cooperation, we conducted a series of user studies in the Block Dilemma (Oudah et al., 2015),
a repeated game in which a suite of cooperative solutions that differ with respect to efficiency, risk, and fairness is
available to the players. The results from these user studies suggest that S#’s failure to establish cooperative relationships with people under certain circumstances is, to some degree, due to differences in how S# and people
approach the efficiency, risk, and fairness of solutions. S# (along with many other artificial intelligence [AI] algorithms) focuses almost exclusively on learning and promoting efficient solutions that give the algorithm high
expected payoffs, whereas people attune their behavior to risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and fairness
(Grgic-Hlaca et al., 2018; Schweitzer and Gibson, 2008; Joseph and Willis, 1963; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993).
This misalignment in behavior sometimes causes conflict between people and machines that inhibits cooperation
and coordination, which indicates that machines whose behaviors address human inclinations toward risk and fairness are more likely to elicit human-machine cooperation and coordination than those that do not.

RESULTS
To better understand when and how human-machine cooperation emerges, we conducted a series of simulations and user studies in the Block Dilemma (Oudah et al., 2015), which is overviewed in Figure 1. In the
Block Dilemma, two players interact in a series of rounds. In each round, the players play an extensive-form
game in which they take turns selecting blocks from the set of nine blocks shown in Figure 1A, with player 1
always selecting a block first in each round. A round ends when each player has selected three blocks. The
number on each block indicates its monetary value in cents (USD). When a player’s three blocks form a valid
set (i.e., all their blocks have the same color, or have the same shape, or have nothing in common), then the
player’s earnings in the round are the sum of the numbers on their blocks. The round earnings of a player
who fails to collect a valid set of blocks is the sum of the numbers on their blocks divided by  4, meaning
that a player who does not get a valid set loses money in that round.
Figures 1B and 1C illustrate the set of potential outcomes of each round of the Block Dilemma. The game
includes unfair solutions, which are substantially more beneficial to one player than the other; fair outcomes
in which both players receive relatively high payoffs (outcomes we refer to as Aloof Cooperation, as they
require the players to coordinate behavior but not interact extensively); and outcomes in which both
players lose money. Another efficient and fair (yet risky) outcome is achieved over multiple rounds when
the players take turns getting the squares and triangles. We call this solution Efficient Cooperation,
because it provides both players with higher average earnings than Aloof Cooperation (which is less risky).
A more detailed description and analysis of the Block Dilemma is given in the Supplemental information
(see Transparent methods: SM 1).
In our first study, we observed the behavior of human-human pairs in the Block Dilemma. In study 2, we
consider the behavior of pairs of robot in this game. These first two studies provide context for the behavior
of human-robot dyads, which we analyze in studies 3 and 4.
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Figure 1. An overview of the Block Dilemma
(A) In each round of the Block Dilemma, the players take turns selecting blocks from this set of nine blocks until each player
has three blocks. Numbers indicate the monetary value (in cents USD) of each block.
(B) The joint payoff space of a single round. The gray-shaded polygon shows the convex hull of the joint payoff space.
Dashed lines indicate the players’ maximin values. Each circle represents a possible joint payoff of a single round. The
dark blue square (Efficient Cooperation) shows the average joint payoff that results from the players taking turns getting
the squares and triangles across consecutive rounds. The outcomes are grouped (by color) and labeled for ease of
exposition.
(C) Five typical round outcomes, the associated (average) per-round value (in USD) of the outcomes to the players, and the
labels we use to categorize the outcomes.

Study 1: human behavior in the Block Dilemma
In the first study, each pair of participants was assigned to one of two conditions: unrestricted communication or no communication. Figure S1 shows the physical setup for these two conditions. Pairs of players
assigned to the condition with unrestricted communication were allowed to freely communicate with each
other in any way they pleased, both verbally and non-verbally. Pairs assigned to the no communication condition were not allowed to communicate with each other in any way. To help keep the players from communicating (including nonverbal communication), we attached blinders to the table, which allowed the players
to see the blocks on the table but not each other’s faces. Participants in this condition were instructed to
not attempt to use any verbal or non-verbal communication during the game; experiment administrators
further ensured that they did not do so.
Forty people (20 pairs) participated in this study. Each interaction lasted 15 rounds, although participants
were not told in advance how many rounds their interaction would last. Participants were paid the amount
of money that they earned throughout the 15 rounds of the game they played. Additional details about the
study design are given in the Supplemental information (see Transparent methods: SM 2).
The results of the study are summarized in Figure 2. In both conditions (with and without communication),
most rounds resulted in cooperation, with bullying behavior being rather rare (Figures 2A and 2C). However, when people were not allowed to communicate with each other, Aloof Cooperation rather than Efficient
Cooperation was prevalent. In fact, across all 10 pairings in which communication was not permitted, there
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Figure 2. Results of human-human pairings in the Block Dilemma
(A) The percentage of rounds across all pairings that resulted in each category of round outcome.
(B) Cooperation rates per round over all pairings, with the top plot showing the percentage of interactions resulting in
Efficient Cooperation and the bottom plot showing the percentage of interactions resulting in either Efficient or Aloof
Cooperation. For better visualization, fitted lines show a linear model of the data, with shaded areas representing 95%
confidence intervals of the model’s fit.
(C) The outcome of each of the 15 rounds of each pairing. For example, in Pairing #2 (no communication), player 1
dominated player 2 in the first three rounds, followed by Aloof Cooperation in the remaining 12 rounds. In Pairings #11–14
(unrestricted communication), the players efficiently cooperated (by taking turns getting the squares) through all 15
rounds of the interactions.

was no instance of Efficient Cooperation (in which the players took turns getting the squares in consecutive
rounds). Thus, whereas people mostly refrained from fighting and bullying in these pairings and generally
cooperated with each other (with cooperation becoming more prevalent over time; Figure 2B), they did not
attain Efficient Cooperation when they could not communicate.
Consistent with past research on the impact of communication on cooperation (Pentland, 2010; De Melo
et al., 2009; de Melo et al., 2014; Oudah et al., 2015, Oudah et al., 2018; Correia et al., 2018; Breazeal
et al., 2005; Oliveira et al., 2018; Taheri et al., 2014; Ricks and Colton, 2010), cooperation among people
was higher when participants were allowed to communicate with each other. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the number of rounds of cooperation in an interaction was greater under unrestricted communication than under no communication (U = 14; p = 0:007). Furthermore, unlike the condition without
communication, pairs of people frequently converged to Efficient Cooperation given the ability to communicate, often beginning in the first round of the interaction (Figures 2B and 2C). As a result of both more
frequent cooperation and more profitable cooperation, participants who could communicate with each
other earned more money than did participants without communication. Participants in the unrestrictedcommunication condition earned $1.08 per round, whereas those in the no-communication condition
earned just $0.67 per round.
Why did pairs of participants opt for the less efficient (although less risky) outcome without communication? An analysis of the communication of participants who were allowed to communicate with each other
provides some insights. First, communication was used by participants to discover Efficient Cooperation as
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a desirable solution. Most pairs of participants who could communicate discussed which round outcome
was ideal. For some pairs, the desirability of Efficient Cooperation over Aloof Cooperation was immediately obvious to both players. To other pairs, it was not so obvious, but communication helped the players
to sort it out. For example, in Pairing #12, whereas player 2 suggested alternating between sets of squares
and triangles starting in the first round, player 1 initially advocated for alternating between sets of red and
blue blocks. After further discussion, they agreed to take turns getting the squares. That said, communication did not help all pairs of players in this way. In Pairing #17, for example, player 1 advocated before the
first round that taking turns getting sets of red and blue blocks was ideal. Player 2 agreed and conformed
throughout the interaction without verifying the calculation.
In addition to helping the players discover which solution to play, communication also helped many pairs
of players negotiate and coordinate Efficient Cooperation. As a prime example, we consider Pairing #15.
After the first round, the players began discussing how they could both ‘‘win.’’ However, it was not until
after the second round that they deliberately calculated and discussed that taking turns getting the
squares and triangles would be better than other forms of cooperation. Despite discussing this form
of cooperation, for the next three rounds player 1 took the squares each round (and player 2 went along
with it). During these rounds, player 1 theorized that he could bully his partner and always get the
squares because he selected the blocks first. Toward the end of round 5, player 2 speculated (in a
friendly way) about whether or not retaliation would be a good strategy against such bullying, and in
round 6 decided to carry it out (which led to neither player getting a valid set that round). Following
this verbal threat and then the carrying out of this threat, player 1 allowed player 2 to get all the squares
in round 7, and the players alternated between getting squares and triangles for the remainder of their
interaction.
In summary, communication helped human players to discover efficient solutions, to negotiate which solutions to play, and to coordinate their behavior. Together, these benefits of communication allowed
many pairs of human players to frequently achieve Efficient Cooperation. On the other hand, none of
the pairs of players in the no-communication condition were able to do so. Without communication,
neither player can easily confirm that the other player thinks alternating between squares and triangles
is a good idea nor can they easily coordinate who should get the squares first. Additionally, without
communication, a player cannot easily confirm whether allowing the other person to have the squares
will be reciprocated in the next round or whether allowing the other player to get the squares will be
viewed as weakness. Finally, without communication, a player cannot communicate the threat that if
the other player does not conform with efficient cooperation, he or she will keep the other player
from getting a valid set. Together, these barriers either discouraged the players from attempting to
play this more efficient (albeit more risky) form of cooperation, or made such attempts by individual
players ineffective.

Study 2: machine behavior in the Block Dilemma
As a point of comparison, we now consider interactions between machines in the Block Dilemma. Over the
last several decades, many different algorithms have been developed for playing repeated games (e.g.,
Littman (1994); Hu and Wellman (1998); Littman (2001); Bowling and Veloso (2002); De Cote and Littman
(2008); Johanson et al. (2012); Albrecht and Ramamoorthy (2013); Crandall (2015); Silver et al. (2016)). In
this article, we chose to use the multi-agent learning algorithm S# (Crandall et al., 2018) to control our robot’s strategic behavior due to (1) its high and robust performance demonstrated in prior evaluations
(including in the Block Dilemma, Oudah et al., 2015), (2) its ability to adapt quickly (a requirement for the
relatively brief 15-round interactions we consider in this research), and (3) its ability to utilize communication signals when interacting with people.
S# is an extension of S++ (Crandall, 2014), an expert algorithm that learns through experience which strategy to follow from among a set of computed strategies E = fe1 ;/;ek g. The set E includes (among others)
the best response strategy given the empirical distribution of its partner’s past behavior (which typically
converges to Aloof Cooperation), the agent’s maximin strategy, and a variety of Pareto-optimal compromises and trigger strategies (Gintis, 2000). In the Block Dilemma, these Pareto-optimal compromises
(which are paired with threats to punish in case of deviations from the compromises) include bullying (insisting on always getting the squares), Efficient Cooperation (taking turns getting the squares and triangles),
and being bullied (allowing one’s partner to always get the squares).
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In addition to computing the set E from a description of the game and the history of play, S++ computes in
each round t the potential of each strategy ej ˛E (denoted rj ðtÞ) and its aspiration level aðtÞ, which encodes
the average per-round payoff the agent should expect to receive if it is successful. Based on these potentials and the aspiration level, S++ computes the set


EðtÞ = ej ˛ E : rj ðtÞ R aðtÞ :

(Equation 1)

In words, EðtÞ consists of the strategies the agent believes could meet its aspirations should its partner
conform. In each round, S++ selects an expert strategy from the set EðtÞ and follows that strategy
throughout the round. Over time, it learns which expert strategy to follow by adjusting its aspiration level
aðtÞ toward its average payoffs (which in turn varies the set EðtÞ) and identifying whether its currently
selected strategy actually achieves its aspirations.
The set EðtÞ (as defined in Equation 1) prioritizes the potential efficiency of strategies rather than the
risk of solutions. Strategies that are perceived to not have the potential to produce sufficiently high
payoffs are excluded from EðtÞ. When the aspiration level aðtÞ is initially set high, the agent will
only select potentially efficient solutions. Only after these potentially efficient solutions have proven unsuccessful (which will result in decreases in the aspiration level aðtÞ over time) will less efficient solutions be considered by the agent. This mechanism has been shown to be responsible for the fast
and effective learning behavior of S++ in repeated games when compared with other expert algorithms (Crandall, 2014), as well as its ability to quickly learn cooperative behavior when associating
with people (Crandall et al., 2018). Importantly, in the Block Dilemma, this mechanism causes the algorithm in early rounds of the interaction to not consider Aloof Cooperation, but to instead seek to either
bully the other player or to play Efficient Cooperation. The exception to this rule is that our implementation of S++ by default selects its best-response strategy in round 1, which can result in Aloof Cooperation in rounds 1 and 2..
S# is identical to S++ when communication between players is not permitted. However, when communication is possible, S# utilizes speech to negotiate a desirable solution with its partner. It does so by (1)
voicing the strategy it currently intends to play and (2) further reducing the set EðtÞ based on proposals
made by its partner (which gives it the potential to more quickly find cooperative solutions with cooperative partners). Full details about S++ and S# as they were implemented for these studies are given by
Crandall et al. (2018).
Figure 3 shows the behavior of two agents (or bots), both of which followed S# to select blocks, when paired
together in the Block Dilemma. Results are shown for both when communication was and was not
permitted. Like pairs of people, these pairs of bots often quickly learned to cooperate with each other
in this game. Additionally, like humans, the bots tended to cooperate more often with communication
than without communication, which led to higher payoffs.
However, when compared with the human-human results shown in Figures 2, Figure 3 also illustrates
several differences between the behavior of bots and humans in the Block Dilemma. First, whereas pairs
of humans typically failed to achieve Efficient Cooperation without communication, these bots often
converged to Efficient Cooperation (Figures 3A and 3C). In fact, Aloof Cooperation among these pairs
of bots was essentially non-existent with and without communication, whereas Efficient Cooperation was
non-existent between humans without communication, although it was somewhat common with communication. Second, bullying (unfair) outcomes, in which one player continually gets the set of squares, was
more common among these bots than among people. This seems to be particularly true when communication is not permitted. Third, the bots were somewhat slower to converge than humans (Figure 3B). As
such, they received lower payoffs on average in early rounds of the interaction, although they quickly
recover after that.
These results indicate that human behavior and machine behavior appear to be somewhat aligned when
communication between players is unrestricted. However, in the absence of communication, human and
machine behaviors appear to be misaligned. Pairs of people avoided risk and unfairness in the absence
of communication at the expense of efficiency (i.e., receiving higher payoffs), whereas pairs of bots initially
prioritized efficiency due to S#’s strategy selection mechanism (see Equation 1) rather than risk and fairness
regardless of whether communication was permitted or not.
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Figure 3. Results of bot-bot pairings in the Block Dilemma
(A) The percentage of rounds across all pairings that resulted in each category of round outcome. Results are averaged
over 40 pairings in each condition.
(B) The percentage of pairings resulting in Efficient Cooperation in each round.
(C) The outcome of all 15 rounds of 10 (out of 40) representative pairings in each condition. For example, in Pairing #24,
the second bot dominated the first bot for the first two rounds; the bots then fought in round 3, but then converged to
Efficient Cooperation for the remaining 12 rounds.

These results indicate that, in a very real sense, the machine’s behavior used in this study was superior in the
Block Dilemma than human behavior when communication was not possible, as pairs of machines often
converged to more profitable solutions than pairs of people. On the other hand, the misalignment between
machine and human behavior could have potential ramifications on the ability of humans and machines to
cooperate with each other. Can S# convince people to efficiently cooperate with it given this misalignment?
We explore this question in the next section.

Study 3: human-robot behavior in the Block Dilemma
To observe human-robot cooperation in the Block Dilemma, we conducted another user study in which a
Sawyer robot, which we call Tibor, interacted with people in a 15-round Block Dilemma (Figures S1C and
Video S1). Tibor was enhanced with additional cameras and a microphone so it could better perceive its
environment and communicate its strategy and internal state to people when playing the Block Dilemma.
The robot was equipped with a screen face, through which it could express emotions, and a pneumatic
gripper, which allowed it to grasp and move blocks. It was also equipped with safety features that allowed
it to operate in close proximity to people. Additional information about Tibor’s hardware and the software
system it used to play the Block Dilemma in this study are provided in the Supplemental information (see
Transparent methods: SM 3).
In addition to using S# to determine which blocks to select, Tibor was equipped with custom features to
communicate with people in the Block Dilemma. First, Tibor verbalized its strategy, its expectations of people, and its feelings (a.k.a., reflections on its internal state) via a speaker. These verbal signals were designed consistently with the speech system produced by S# in previously published studies (Oudah
et al., 2015; Crandall et al., 2018). Second, Tibor verbalized statements related to game flow, such as
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requesting the human’s help recovering from known failures. Third, Tibor expressed its emotions through
facial expressions, displayed on its face (Figure S2). Tibor’s facial expressions included joy, surprise, anger,
sadness, or no feeling (neutral). The facial expression displayed on Tibor’s face was selected to be consistent with the internal state of S#. Fourth, in an attempt to make Tibor appear conscious of its environment,
we animated Tibor’s mouth and eyes so that it blinked and tracked people’s faces and hand movements.
Additional details about Tibor’s verbal and non-verbal communication signals are provided in the Supplemental information (see Transparent methods: SM 3).
Tibor’s human partner in the game could likewise communicate verbally with Tibor by talking into a microphone. To aid Tibor’s understanding of its human partners, human speech was limited to the set of phrases
listed in Table S3. This set of speech acts allowed human participants to propose solutions (e.g., ‘‘This
round, I get the squares’’) and express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with proposals and outcomes (e.g.,
‘‘That’s not fair.’’). Before each round, Tibor processed all the proposals made by the human during the previous round and used these as input to S#.
As in the human-human and machine-machine studies reported in the previous sections, we studied human-robot cooperation in the Block Dilemma under different communication conditions. In this case,
the communication conditions were defined by the communication signals conveyed by Tibor, which we
divided into two categories: (1) signals dealing with strategy, including both proposed solutions and its expectations of its partner’s behavior, and (2) signals designed to communicate emotion and the robot’s
awareness of the environment. We refer to the first set of signals as Strategy Signals, and the second set
of signals as Signals of Personal Touch. Additional details for how Tibor’s signals were categorized in
this study are given in the Supplemental information (see Transparent methods: SM 3, and Tables S1
and S2).
This user study followed a 232 between-subjects design in which strategic communication (off or on) and
personal touch (off or on) were the independent variables. In conditions under which strategic communication was enabled, Tibor explicitly expressed Strategy Signals (as they were selected by S#), whereas when
they were disabled, Tibor did not express those signals. Likewise, in conditions under which personal touch
was disabled, Tibor’s face was static (neutral expression with no blinking or mouth movements), it would
just look straight forward. Likewise, it did not voice speech acts related to feelings or its awareness of
the environment (except speech required to recover from errors to keep the game flowing). Tibor’s
communication varied based on the condition of the study, whereas the human player was able to voice
speech to Tibor in all conditions, which can impact Tibor’s behavior (because S#, the strategic algorithm
used by Tibor, uses proposals from its partner to adapt its strategy).
Forty-five people participated in the study. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: No communication, Personal Touch, Strategy, or Strategy + Personal Touch. The same protocol
was followed for each participant as in the human-human study described in Study 1, except that only
one person participated in the study at a time. The participant in this study was always assigned to be
player 1 (the player who selected the block first in each round), and Tibor was player 2. Additional details
about the study are given in the Supplemental information (see Transparent methods: SM 2–4 and
Figure S3).
In the studies of human behavior and machine behavior discussed in the previous sections, we observed
that both people and S# often converge to Efficient Cooperation in the Block Dilemma when communication is permitted. As such, we would expect a high degree of human-robot cooperation given unrestricted
communication. However, when communication was not permitted, pairs of people typically converged to
Aloof Cooperation (and never to Efficient Cooperation) in the Block Dilemma, whereas S# in self-play often
converged to Efficient Cooperation (and never to Aloof Cooperation). Thus, there is more uncertainty
regarding what will happen when people and Tibor are paired together in the Block Dilemma with
restricted communication. In such circumstances, will the human or robot adapt to the other, or will fighting
or bullying punctuate the relationship?
The results of our study in which people interacted with Tibor in the Block Dilemma are summarized in Figure 4. These results show that when all robot signals (i.e., both Strategy Signals and Signals of Personal
Touch) were disabled, people cooperated with Tibor in only about 25% of the rounds (Figures 4A–4C).
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Figure 4. Results of human-robot pairings in the Block Dilemma
(A) The average percentage of rounds that resulted in each category of round outcome.
(B) The percentage of interactions ending in either Efficient or Aloof Cooperation in each round.
(C) The percentage of interactions ending in Efficient Cooperation in each round. (For simplicity, only the no signals and Strategy + Personal Touch
conditions are shown in B and C).
(D) The outcome of each of the 15 rounds of each pairing.

In fact, without robot communication, only three of twelve participants established Efficient Cooperation
with Tibor for at least two consecutive rounds (Figure 4D). In all other conditions, cooperation rates
were more than double, including relatively high levels of Efficient Cooperation when Strategy Signals
were enabled. A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the robot’s Strategy Signals had a significant impact
on human-robot cooperation (for overall cooperation: U = 369, p = 0:009; for Efficient Cooperation:
U = 380, p = 0:003). As a result, the average per-round payoff of both the human ($0.76 versus $0.46)
and the robot ($1.04 versus $0.76) was higher when the robot expressed Strategy Signals than when it
did not. Signals of Personal Touch alone likewise raised cooperation over no signals at all (significant for
overall cooperation: U = 19, p = 0:007; marginally significant for Efficient Cooperation: U = 33:5, p =
0:061).
In short, whereas S# in self-play often reached Efficient Cooperation in the Block Dilemma without explicitly
communicating, it typically was unable to elicit Efficient Cooperation from human players without explicitly
communicating with them. Similarly, whereas pairs of human players often achieved Aloof Cooperation
without communicating with each other, human-robot pairs did not achieve high levels of Aloof Cooperation when the robot did not communicate. The behavioral difference between the players (wherein pairs
of machines tend to find the risky but efficient solution, whereas pairs of people tend to find the less risky
but less efficient solution) appears to create a disconnect that produces a dysfunctional relationship
wherein both players lose money in many rounds (Fight).
The phrases chosen by participants to communicate with the robot are helpful in understanding human
behavior in the Block Dilemma. Across the four conditions, 36 of 45 participants proposed (or agreed to)
Efficient Cooperation (17 of 23 in conditions without Strategy Signals, 19 of 22 in conditions with Strategy
Signals) at least once during their interaction with the robot. However, 39 of the 45 participants also voiced
other forms of proposals. These other proposals were most often some form of Aloof Cooperation,
although proposals to ‘‘always get the squares’’ or to let the robot ‘‘always get the squares’’ were also
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made. That said, Efficient Cooperation was only the first proposal made by just 12 of 45 participants—most
participants voiced some other proposal first. Together, these results indicate that participants typically
(but not always) identified Efficient Cooperation as a possibility. However, they either did not always think
it was ideal or they did not believe they could get the robot to carry it out.
The robot’s communication signals (to its human partner) appear to have been influential in turning human
proposals of Efficient Cooperation into actual Efficient Cooperation. Of the 28 pairings in which the human
participant discussed Efficient Cooperation with the robot when Strategy Signals or Signals of Personal
Touch were given by the robot, 23 pairings eventually arrived at Efficient Cooperation. On the other
hand, in the condition with no robot signals, only three of the eight pairings (Pairings #102, #103, and
#105) in which humans proposed Efficient Cooperation to the robot eventually reached Efficient Cooperation. The other five participants failed to establish Efficient Cooperation with the robot for various reasons.
The human participant in Pairing #104 proposed Efficient Cooperation in round 6. The human participant
tried to carry out the proposal (seeking to get all the squares in round 6 and all the triangles in rounds 7 and
8), but the robot did not conform (but instead tried to bully the human). On the other hand, the human participants in Pairings #110 and #112 proposed Efficient Cooperation, but then refused to give the robot the
squares when it was the robot’s turn to get them. This led to frequent fighting. The human participant in
Pairing #109, on the other hand, simply went for a mixed set after proposing Efficient Cooperation when
the robot intended to allow the human to get all the squares. The eighth participant (in Pairing #106)
did not propose Efficient Cooperation until round 15, so it is unclear whether or not Efficient Cooperation
would have emerged had the interaction lasted longer. Thus, the lack of robot communication appears to
have made it difficult for the players to negotiate and coordinate the risky and somewhat sophisticated solution of Efficient Cooperation in the Block Dilemma.
Communication logs also indicate differences in how the robot and human viewed fairness. In the 22 interactions in which the robot’s Strategy Signals were enabled, the robot proposed that it should always get all
the squares in 12 of them (doing so a total of 32 times in those interactions). On the other hand, the human
participant explicitly proposed that they should always get all the squares in just four of those interactions
(all 22 participants made at least one proposal in these conditions). These differences further illustrate the
differences in the robot’s and the humans’ overall strategies in relationship to fairness. Interestingly, these
differences appear to have contributed to an imbalance in earnings, with the robot earning $0.90 per round
(over all conditions) and human participants earning just $0.61 per round.
These results suggest that, rather than focusing exclusively on the efficiency of solutions, machines must
also consider other attributes of solutions (such as risk and fairness) to establish cooperative relationships
with people. Machines can do this by either aligning their behavior with people (even if it means playing
less efficient solutions) or finding ways to making these efficient solutions appear more appealing and
achievable to people.

Study 4: human-disguised AI behavior in the Block Dilemma
Results of our human-human study (Study 1) showed that humans tended to converge to Aloof Cooperation when they could not communicate. On the other hand, in the user study presented in the last section,
human-robot cooperation was substantially lower, punctuated with higher rates of dysfunction, when the
robot did not communicate. However, the cause of these differences is unclear as the conditions of these
studies differed in three ways. First, the identity of the playing partner (human or robot) was visible to the
players in both studies, and this has been shown to cause human bias that results in lower cooperation
when people interact with artificial agents than with people (Ishowo-Oloko et al., 2019). Second, participants were allowed to speak to their partner (the robot) in the human-robot study, whereas they were
not allowed to speak to each other in the human-human study when communication was not permitted.
Third, the strategy used by humans differed from that of S#. Hence, we cannot determine whether the physical identity of one’s partner (human or robot), the communication condition, or the partner’s strategy (or all
three) caused the primary differences in these outcomes.
To address which of these factors is primarily responsible for the differences, we conducted a final user
study. This study was identical to the no-communication condition of the human-human study reported
in Study 1 (see the configuration shown in Figure S1B), except that the second human (player 2) was a confederate that simply selected blocks as dictated by S#. The 10 study participants involved in this study were
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Figure 5. Comparison of outcomes with non-communicating partners
(A) The average percentage of rounds over all participants that resulted in each category of round outcome when people were paired with other people,
Tibor, and a disguised AI, each of whom did not communicate.
(B) Summaries of each round for all pairings in each condition.
(C) The percentage of interactions ending in either Efficient or Aloof Cooperation in each round. For better visualization, fitted lines show a linear model of
the data, with shaded areas representing 95% confidence intervals of the model’s fit.
(D) The average payoffs received by people and their partners. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.

unaware that their partner was following actions suggested by an algorithm. Thus, this study differed from
the no-communication condition of the human-human study only with respect to the strategy used by
player 2. We refer to this condition as the Disguised-AI condition.
The results of this study, alongside the results from the no-communication and no-robot-signals conditions
of the human-human and the human-robot studies, are shown in Figure 5. A visual inspection of the average
round outcome (Figure 5A), the distribution of outcomes in individual interactions (Figure 5B), and overall
cooperation rates over time (Figure 5C) show substantial similarity between human-robot (no signals) and
human-disguised AI pairings, and substantial differences between those studies and the human-human results. Mann-Whitney tests comparing human-human and human-disguised AI pairs show a marginally statistically significant difference between rates of overall cooperation (U = 27, p = 0:087), and a statistically
significant difference between rates of Fighting (U = 82:5, p = 0:014). As a result, the human’s payoffs were
only about half as much when associating with a robot or disguised AI than when associating with another
person (Figure 5D). On the other hand, due to high rates of the robot dominating and bullying its human
partners, the human partner’s payoffs varied little.
Thus, although these results do not rule out the possibility that the differences in the communication condition or the knowledge of the robot as a partner (rather than a human) contributed to differences in cooperation rates, they suggest that the differences we observed in the human-human and human-robot are
primarily driven by the strategy used by the robot (and disguised AI). The robot’s inability to establish cooperative relationships with people without communication is due to its failure to align its own behavior with
human behavior (or vice versa).

DISCUSSION
In this article, we analyzed and studied various enablers and barriers to human-robot cooperation. Prior
work has shown that the algorithm S# establishes and maintains cooperative relationships with people
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Table 1. Predominant behavioral tendencies observed in the Block Dilemma

Human Dyads

Machine Dyads

Human-Machine Dyads

With communication

Efficient Cooperation

Efficient Cooperation

Efficient Cooperation

Without communication

Aloof Cooperation

Efficient Cooperation

Fight

in a variety of repeated games when it is allowed to verbally communicate with people (Oudah et al., 2015,
Oudah et al., 2018; Crandall et al., 2018). Although the ability of machines to cooperate with people at rates
that mirror human cooperation is encouraging, these same studies illustrate that S# often fails to establish
cooperative relationships with people when it cannot verbally communicate with them. In fact, S#’s ability
to cooperate with like-minded machines without verbal communication is substantially higher than its ability to cooperate with people (Crandall et al., 2018).
To better understand how to design machines that elicit cooperation with people in repeated games (even
without verbal communication), we conducted a series of simulations and user studies in the Block
Dilemma, a rich resource-sharing scenario that has many solutions that vary with respect to efficiency, fairness, and risk. In particular, the game contains a set of inefficient, fair, and less risky solutions (which we
refer to as Aloof Cooperation); an efficient, fair, and more risky solution (which we refer to as Efficient Cooperation); and a set of efficient but less fair solutions that provides incentives for players to seek their own
welfare over that of their partner.
Although both strategic concerns (i.e., machine behavior (Rahwan et al., 2019)) and human psychological
biases can impact human-robot cooperation, our results indicate that strategic concerns have the most
impact on human-robot cooperation in the Block Dilemma. A summary of the outcomes of these studies
is shown in Table 1. When players are allowed to communicate with each other, human behavior and machine behavior (as defined by S#) are aligned—both pairs of humans and pairs of machines tend to
converge to Efficient Cooperation. Unsurprisingly given this finding, human-machine pairs also frequently
converge to Efficient Cooperation when they can communicate. On the other hand, without communication, human behavior and machine behavior are not aligned, as pairs of humans tend to converge to Aloof
Cooperation, whereas pairs of machines converge to Efficient Cooperation. As a result, when people and
these machines are paired together in the Block Dilemma, they often fail to cooperate when communication is restricted due to their strategic differences.
In short, human behavior in the Block Dilemma, which is based on perceptions of risk, fairness, and efficiency, stands in contrast to that of S#, whose sole focus is on the efficiency of solutions. As Aloof Cooperation in the Block Dilemma does not produce payoffs that initially meet its aspiration level, S# does
not consider playing it initially. Thus, when people’s assessments of risk and fairness discourage them
from considering more efficient solutions, S# is unable to consistently find common ground with people
until its aspiration level drops substantially (at which point it does consider less efficient solutions).
Analyses of communication patterns in these studies indicate that although communication is less important to establishing machine-machine cooperation, human players rely on communication to find and play
efficient but risky outcomes. In scenarios in which fair and efficient solutions have high risk, communication
helps human players to (1) discover efficient solutions, (2) determine that the other player is also aware of
these solutions, and then (3) negotiate which solution to play and coordinate how to play it. Without such
communication, efficient cooperation can seem to be too risky to human players, even though committing
to such solutions could yield higher payoffs (payoffs that are often achieved by pairs of machines without
communication).
Other learning algorithms differ from S#, whereas machine behavior is typically produced using the
concept of maximizing expected utility (Russell and Norvig, 2009) (which is closely related to the efficiency
of payoffs). Because people often do not maximize expected utility (e.g., prospect theory shows that people weigh risks differently than benefits, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), other algorithms designed with
respect to this methodology will also likely encounter many of the same issues as S#. The results of this
article suggest the need for a different approach, one that carefully balances the efficiency, fairness, and
risk of solutions in a way that better allows the machine to relate with people, and vice versa.
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A first potential approach is based on computing detailed models of human behavior (e.g., Peled et al.,
2015) and then computing optimal solutions with respect to those models. This approach falls under the
umbrella of opponent modeling (Albrecht and Stone, 2018). When such models are accurate, opponent
modeling can produce algorithms that conform with human behavior, such as playing less efficient (less
risky) solutions in the Block Dilemma when communication is restricted. However, such approaches risk
robbing the machine of opportunities to achieve more efficient solutions (Crandall et al., 2018). Furthermore, obtaining accurate models of people for arbitrary scenarios (rather than situation-specific models
built by data gathered in specific scenarios) remains extremely difficult despite a myriad of approaches
that have been investigated over many years (Albrecht and Stone, 2018; Crandall, 2020).
A second (alternate) approach to creating machines capable of aligning machine and human behavior embraces the advantages of machines in computing efficient solutions. Such machines would still advocate for
more efficient solutions, but would do so in a way that would help people be more prone to considering
these more efficient (albeit potentially risky) solutions when warranted. By better considering and
balancing efficiency, fairness, and risk in machine behavior in this way, we believe that machines can overcome important barriers to human-machine cooperation.

Limitations of the study
The insights gleaned from these studies were obtained for a single scenario (the Block Dilemma). Furthermore, the human-robot interactions were considered in the context of a single robot system. Similar kinds
of studies that consider different scenarios (with potentially different payoff structures and characteristics
of interaction) and robot systems may produce different kinds of outcomes. Of particular mention is the
strategy used by the robot to make decisions and communicate with people. In this article, our robot
used the algorithm S# (Crandall et al., 2018) to make decisions and to communicate with people. However,
other algorithms with alternative strategic characteristics are likely to induce different outcomes (including
different forms of cooperation) when interacting with people (e.g., Oudah et al. (2015)). Our studies highlight the need for further studies that analyze how the strategic nature of the algorithm used by the robot
impact human-robot cooperation.
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Supplementary Figures and Tables
A
C

B

Figure S1: Physical setups for the various user studies conducted in this research. Related to Studies 1, 3, and 4 and Figures 2, 4, and 5. (A) The
physical setup for the unrestricted-communication condition of Study 1. (B) The physical setup for the no-communication condition of Study 1 and
the human-disguised AI condition of Study 4. In these conditions, physical barriers were placed on the table to keep the study participants from
seeing each other’s faces. (C) The physical setup used in Study 3, in which study participants played the Block Dilemma with Tibor (a Sawyer
robot).

Neutral

(a) Neutral

Joy

Surprise

Anger

Sadness

(b) Joy

(c) Surprise

(d) Anger

(e) Sadness

Figure S2: The five facial expressions used by Tibor. Related to Study 3 and Figure 4.
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Figure S3: The scoreboard interface displayed to participants to help them keep track of their interaction. Related to Studies 3 and 4 and Figures 4
and 5.

Table S1: Example speech acts used by Tibor to communicate its strategy and to establish personal touch. Related to Study 3 and Figure 4.

Scenario
Between rounds
Cooperation
has emerged
Partner
deviated

Strategy
- I always get all of the squares.
- Let’s take turns getting the better blocks.
- Let’s continue this.
- That’s what I wanted.
- I’ll just make sure you lose your money.
- I’m going to make you regret doing that.

Personal Touch
- I’m enjoying this.
- Things are not going my way.
- Excellent.
- Great!
- You jerk! Be nice to me.
- Serves you right, jerk.

Table S2: Example speech acts used by Tibor to recover from errors. Related to Study 3 and Figure 4.

Scenario
Grasping error

Personal Touch

Vision error

- I hate not seeing perfectly.
- Vision is such a good thing to
have working.

Recovery (all conditions)
- Please pick up the red square block for me
- Oops. Let me try again.
- Please make sure all blocks are visible.
- I have to reset my vision subsystem.
- Your hand is in the way of my vision.
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Table S3: The set of speech acts provided to human players to communicate with Tibor. Related to Study 3 and Figure 4.

ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Message
I want the [squares/triangles/circles]
You can have the [squares/triangles/circles]
I always get the [squares/triangles/circles]
I want the [red/blue/purple] blocks
You can have the [red/blue/purple] blocks
I always get the [red/blue/purple] blocks
Let’s each get a mixed set
Let’s always get mixed sets
You can always have the [squares/triangles/circles]
You can always have the [red/blue/purple] blocks
Let’s take turns getting the [squares/triangles/circles] and [squares/triangles/circles]
Let’s take turns getting the [red/blue/purple] and [red/blue/purple] blocks
Yes, I accept your last proposal
No, I don’t accept your proposal
Sweet! We are getting along
You will pay for this
Curse you
In your face
I forgive you
Give me another chance
Excellent
We can both do better than this
That’s not fair
Do it or I will punish you
You misunderstood me
You betrayed me
I don’t trust you
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Transparent Methods
SM 1: The Block Dilemma
The Block Dilemma is a resource-sharing scenario in which two players repeatedly interact with each other. In this
section, we describe the dynamics of the game and its strategic characteristics. In subsequent sections, we describe a
series of simulations and user studies we conducted with the Block Dilemma to study human-machine cooperation.
Game Description
In the Block Dilemma, two players interact in a series of rounds. In each round, the players play an extensive-form
game in which they take turns selecting blocks from the set of nine blocks shown in Figure 1A (in the main paper),
with player 1 always selecting a block first in each round. The round ends when each player has selected three blocks.
The number on each block indicates its monetary value in cents (USD). When a player’s three blocks form a valid
set (i.e., all their blocks have the same color, or have the same shape, or have nothing in common), then the player’s
earnings in the round are the sum of the numbers on their blocks. The round earnings of a player that fails to collect a
valid set of blocks is the sum of the numbers on their blocks divided by −4, meaning that a player that does not get a
valid set loses money in that round.
Payoff Space
To illustrate how sets of blocks equate with payoffs (money earned) in the Block Dilemma, several common
round outcomes are shown in Figure 1C (main paper). However, many other round outcomes are possible (673 to be
exact); the full set of round outcomes are plotted in Figure 1B. We categorize these round outcomes into six different
categories. Two categories consist of outcomes in which one of the players gets all of the squares (labeled Player 1
Bullies and Player 2 Bullies, respectively). The set of squares is the most profitable valid set, and is worth $2.00.
However, this leaves the other player with a relatively poor set of blocks worth at best $0.50 (when the other player
selects the triangles; see example #1 in Figure 1C).
Because outcomes in which one player gets all the squares are seemingly unfair, attempts to get all of the squares
may be met with opposition from the other player. Example #2 in Figure 1C illustrates a scenario in which player 1
selects the red square first and then player 2 selects the red triangle. Player 1 then reveals its intention to try to get all
of the square by taking the blue square. Player 2 prohibits this by selecting the purple square. Player 1 then retaliates
and takes the blue circle, which is the block that player 2 needed to complete a valid set. As a result, neither player
gets a valid set, resulting in both players losing money in the round. We label this outcome a Fight, noting that 452 of
the 673 possible round outcomes are likewise Fights in which neither player gets a valid set (hence each loses money
in the round).
To avoid fights, players may seek to get other valid block sets, such as the mixed sets (in which no block has the
same shape or color) shown in Example #3 in Figure 1C. Each mixed set is worth $0.90, and it is possible for both
players to get such a set in a round. Other pairs of block sets are also possible, such as when one player gets all of the
red blocks (worth $1.15) while the other player gets all of the blue blocks (worth $0.85). We categorize outcomes in
which both players get valid sets but neither player gets all of the squares as Aloof Cooperation, since these outcomes
require the players to coordinate their selections, but do not require the players to engage substantially beyond that.
The players just need to coordinate which sets they pursue so that they do not need the same block to complete their
sets (see Example #4 in Figure 1C for a scenario in which the players fail to coordinate).
Outcomes labeled as Aloof Cooperation are more fair than the bully outcomes, in that the differences between the
players’ earning in a round are lower. However, as illustrated in Figure 1B, none of the outcomes labeled as Aloof
Cooperation produce payoffs on the Pareto boundary of the convex polygon that defines the game’s convex hull (the
grey-shaded region in the Figure). Only round outcomes in which one player gets all of the squares reside on this
Pareto boundary, and these outcomes are not fair. However, a fair and Pareto efficient average joint payoff is produced
over a series of rounds when players take turns getting the squares and triangles (Example #5 in Figure 1C). This joint
behavior, which we call Efficient Cooperation, yields a player $2.00 in one round followed by $0.50 in the next round,
resulting in an average per-round payoff of $1.25. As such, Efficient Cooperation is more profitable for both players
than any form of Aloof Cooperation.
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Despite being better for both players than Aloof Cooperation, seeking the compromise of Efficient Cooperation is
risky for a variety of reasons. First, this solution exposes the players to risk since it requires one player to receive a
low payoff in one round with the hope that the other player will allow them to receive a high payoff in the next round.
Thus, opening one’s self to the opportunity of Efficient Cooperation exposes a player to being exploited. Second,
seeking Efficient Cooperation when the other player will not agree with it can be costly. For example, by selecting
two squares, a player exposes itself to the potentiality of a high loss if the other player decides to take the third square
(see Example #2 in Figure 1C). The other player may interpret the attempt to get all of the squares in a round as
greedy (it is easily conflated with a desire to bully), which can lead to conflict and Fights. In short, seeking Efficient
Cooperation is risky, similar to hunting stag instead of hunting hare in a Stag Hunt (Skyrms., 2004).
Game Theoretic Analysis
Since neither player can get a valid set in a round without the cooperation of the other player, both players’
minimax values are below 0.0. If both players use minimax (Nash, 1928) to select blocks, player 1 would select all of
the purple blocks while player 2 would select all of the blue blocks (under the assumption of a reasonable tie-breaking
strategy), resulting in round payoffs of $0.70 and $0.85, respectively. This solution is a rather inefficient instance of
Aloof Cooperation. We did not observe any instance of this outcome in any of the studies reported in this paper.
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (Nash, 1950; Gintis, 2000) of a single round of the Block Dilemma correspond to the cases in which each player gets a mixed set of blocks, resulting in round earnings of $0.90 to each player.
Other Nash equilibria of the round of a game do exist, albeit they are not sub-game perfect. If one player can convince
the other player that they are not fully rational, they can bully the other player so that they get a higher payoff. For
example, player 1 could threaten player 2 that if player 2 does not let them get all of the squares, then they will not let
player 2 get a valid set. If player 2 believes this threat, they would be better off selecting only triangles (thus letting
player 1 take all of the squares). However, such a threat is risky. Selecting multiple squares could result in a large loss
if player 2 does not conform. The threat is also irrational, as carrying it out would not be in player 1’s self interest
with respect to the current round’s payoffs. As such, this equilibrium strategy is not sub-game perfect.
When the game is played repeatedly with a reasonably high probability of the players interacting again after each
round, the folk theorem (Gintis, 2000) shows that the game has many Nash equilibria. These Nash equilibria all
produce payoffs within the game’s convex hull (the grey-shaded region in Figure 1B) that give both players higher
payoffs than their maximin values. However, not all points in this space are equally valuable, nor will self-interested
players agree on which outcome in this space is most desirable. One possible point of compromise that is both fair and
Pareto optimal is the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950), which corresponds to Efficient Cooperation wherein the
players take turns getting the squares and triangles.
SM 2: User Study Details
Procedures
For each participant, the study1 proceeded as follows:
1. The subjects participated in the study in groups of two. Each pair was assigned one of the two study conditions
based on a previously determined schedule defining the order in which pairs were to be assigned to conditions.
Figure S1A-B shows the setup for human-human pairs in both conditions, while Figure S1C illustrates the
physical setup for human-robot pairings.
2. The participants were separately instructed on how to play the Block Dilemma and how they were to be paid.
The participants were allowed to ask whatever questions they desired. At the end of this training, each participant was asked questions verifying their understanding of the basic rules of the game. Any questions missed by
the participants were reviewed and misconceptions were clarified.
1 The

user studies in this paper were approved by Brigham Young University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
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3. Each participant played a single 15-round game with their assigned partner (participants were involved in only
a single study each). Participants were not told how many rounds of the game they would play. In each round,
player 1 selected a block first. Throughout the game, the history of moves was displayed on a screen visible to
each participant. The screen also showed the participant the current running tally of the money they had earned
over all rounds played so far. The game typically lasted between 20-30 minutes.
4. Upon completing the 15-round game, the participant completed a post-game survey questionnaire, consisting
of questions (answered on a 5-point Likert scale) in which participants rated themselves and their partner with
respect to seven attributes: trustworthiness, vengeance, predictability, cooperativeness, deviousness, propensity
to bully, and selfishness.
5. The participants were paid through a money voucher, which they could redeem immediately for cash. The
amount of money paid to the participants was equal to the amount of money earned in the game, except that
each participant was given $10 (USD) at a minimum.
Demographic Information of Study Participants
Human-human study (Study 1): Forty students (31 males, 9 females) were recruited from the Brigham Young
University campus in Provo, UT, USA to participate in this study. The average age of the participants was 22.8 years.
Eight-five percent of the study participants were majoring in a degree related to science or technology and 93% had
some degree of familiarity with strategic games. In order to avoid biases, pairs for each game were formed such that
the respective players were not familiar with each other prior to the study.
Human-robot study (Study 3): Forty-five students (32 males, 13 females) were recruited from the Brigham Young
University campus in Provo, UT, USA to participate in this study. To avoid learning effects, these participants were
distinct from those participating in the other studies. The average age of the participants was 22.7 years. Sixty-six
percent of the study participants had a science/technology background and 98% had some degree of familiarity with
strategic games. Several additional people also participated in the study. However, due to system errors and failures
(which either prohibited the 15 rounds from completing or otherwise compromised the results), we discarded the results from those interactions.
Human-Disguised AI study (Study 4): Ten participants (6 males, 4 females) were recruited from the Brigham Young
University campus in Provo, UT, USA to participate in this study. To avoid learning effects, these participants were
distinct from those participating in the other studies. The average age of the participants was 22.2 years. Eight of the
ten participants came from STEM backgrounds.
SM 3: Robot System
Tibor is a Sawyer robot developed by Rethink Robotics which we enhanced with additional cameras and a microphone so it could better perceive its environment and communicate strategy and personal touch. In this section, we
provide additional information about Tibor’s behavior and processes.
Vision and Grasping
In our studies, Tibor perceived its environment using a wide-angle camera for face tracking and a Kinect2 Wiedemeyer (2015) for detecting and localizing blocks and recognizing hand movements over the table. The wide-angle
camera, mounted to Tibor’s head, used a Haar cascade in combination with a Kalman filter to detect and track faces.
The Kinect2 was mounted from the ceiling, giving a bird’s-eye view of the table, player and blocks. Hands and blocks
were detected using a combination of color and shape detection using OpenCV Bradski (2000), and then localized
by indexing into a point cloud which yielded the respective (x, y, z) coordinates of the blocks or hands. The block
coordinates were then passed into the manipulation system, which uses MoveIt Sucan and Chitta (2013) for motion
planning. Hand detection was reported to the agent so it could decide when it was safe to engage in a manipulation
task.
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Error Detection and Recovery
The robot sometimes failed to identify or pick up a block because both vision and grasping were subject to
substantial hardware, software, and environmental complexities. Thus, we created various recovery mechanisms that
would allow the robot to keep its interaction going in the presence of errors. For example, when failing to pick up
a block the robot reattempted the action once. If still unsuccessful, Tibor would then ask the human for assistance
instead.
In event of an unexpected failure of the vision subsystem, the system would automatically restart it. It was also
able to detect known reasons for failure and propose potential recovery mechanisms. For example, Tibor would ask
the player to move their hand when it sensed that the blocks were occluded by the player’s hand.
Tibor’s Communication
Tibor used both verbal communication (speech acts) and non-verbal communication (gaze and facial expression)
capabilities. This section describes them one by one, and then discusses more in depth how the various signals were
categorized as either Personal Touch or Strategy signals.
Speech Acts
Tibor’s speech acts are triggered by S# (see Crandall et al. (2018)) as well as several other system modules.
Example speech acts used by Tibor are shown in Table S1 and Table S2. This table illustrates how different speech
acts can be used to communicate signals relating to Tibor’s strategy, personal touch, and error recovery in different
game scenarios. For example, in between rounds, S# largely communicates the feelings related to the last round of
play (personal touch) as well as its intended behavior and expectations for the upcoming round (strategy). During the
round, other modules (such as vision and grasping) detect anomalies which prevent normal game flow. When such
anomalies are detected Tibor communicates its awareness of a particular subsystem’s failure resulting in a reattempt of
a task, restart of a subsystem, or requesting assistance from the human (always regardless of personal touch or strategy
being enabled). Additionally, Tibor will also express feelings of frustration when failures occur and happiness upon
recovery from the error (personal touch).
Facial Expressions and Gaze
In addition to verbal communication, Tibor seeks to express its feelings and consciousness through non verbal
communication such as facial expressions and gaze. This was enabled only in the conditions enabling personal touch.
Tibor’s facial expressions consisted of three components. The first component is a static expression reflective of
Tibor’s current emotional state (as communicated to it by the S# algorithm) using the faces shown in Figure S2. Five
emotions are supported: neutral, joy, surprise, anger, and sadness. Secondly, to convey consciousness, Tibor blinks
periodically. Finally, to give speech a life-like quality, Tibor’s mouth is animated during speech.
Tibor also uses gaze, via head and eye movements, to convey its consciousness of its partner, the environment, and
the game flow. For example, Tibor looks down at the user’s hand as they pick up a block. Once the user has finished
selecting a block, Tibor makes eye contact with its partner. Additionally, Tibor focuses its eyes on the block that it
picks, and then looks at where it intends to place the block while moving it. Tibor ends its turn by both facing and
looking at it’s partner.
Categorizing Signals: Personal Touch vs. Strategy
The separation between communication related to strategy and communication relating to personal touch becomes
blurred in some cases. We wish to be clear about how the communication was classified in our personal touch and
strategic conditions.
• All non-verbal communication including expressions and gaze was attributed to personal touch.
• All verbal communication explicitly stating strategy was attributed to strategic communication.
• All verbal communication solely communicating emotion was attributed to personal touch.
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• All verbal communication implicitly stating strategy, but with emotion could be classified as personal touch
communication. 2
• We attempted to not even consider communication that both explicitly stated strategy and also had emotionally
charged words, as such phrases could not be considered an independent variable.
Listening
An additional aspect of S# is that it adapts its behavior based on the strategic proposals made by its partner. Tibor
receives these and other speech acts from its partner via a voice interface. To account for the limited-voice recognition
capabilities of our robot, we limited people to voicing the set of speech acts shown in Table S3. At the beginning of
each round, S# processes all of the speech acts that the player had said since the last round. If strategic communication
is enabled, Tibor responds with acceptance or rejection of any strategic proposal by the human, prior to conveying his
strategy for that round.
SM 4: User Interface
Available Speech Acts
Human participants in our human-robot study were given a predefined set of speech acts they could use that the
robot understood. The list of phrases are given in Table S3. The user could state any phrase they wanted at any time,
though the robot only processed these messages (in batch) at the beginning of each round.
Interface
In all user studies, a scoreboard (Figure S3) was displayed to each human participant throughout the duration of
the game to help them understand the state of the game. This scoreboard contained:
• A illustration of the blocks and their point values.
• A depiction of the current state of the round.
• The money earned by the player so far.
• The play history, showing the blocks selected by each player in each round.
• The chat history (For games where speech was allowed).
• Notification bar indicating whose turn it was, or whether it was time to set up the table for a new round.
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2 To some degree, all verbal communication with emotion could be construed as having a purpose or a strategy to it. Verbal communication is
often used to manipulate the actions of others or convince someone to see your side. Therefore it is hard to get rid of all ’strategy’ from emotionally
charged speech. However, for the purposes of this study, we decided that only explicit strategy proposals would be classified as strategic speech.
In addition, we tried to minimize the amount of strategy that could be implicitly deduced from personal touch communication.
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